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Has the Productivity Trend 
Steepened in the 1990s?
By Andrew J. Filardo
I
n the 1990s, conventional measures of produc-
tivity growth, or the growth in output per
worker, have indicated a dramatic rise. If these
measures are correct, the economic benefits are
clear. In the short run, sustained, faster productivity
growth would enable the economy to expand more
rapidly without intensifying inflationary pressures.
In the long run, sustained, faster productivity
growth would boost real incomes and improve the
standard of living. Since 1960, for example, produc-
tivity advances have helped the typical worker pro-
duce 70 percent more output per hour, more than
doubling personal incomes. 
Despite signs that productivity has recently begun
to follow a steeper path, some analysts are skeptical.
Episodes of faster productivity growth in the past
have often reflected cyclical influences rather than
fundamental trend shifts. And, the conventional
productivity measure, which is based on fixed-
weighted productivity data, has recently shown an
upward bias.
To address these concerns, this article reexam-
ines the conventional, fixed-weighted productivity
measure and also uses a new chain-weighted mea-
sure to assess productivity growth. The first section
of the article summarizes the empirical evidence
and describes the theoretical arguments in support
of the view that the trend of productivity has steep-
ened. The second section challenges this view of
productivity in three parts. The first part challenges
the theoretical arguments. The next part suggests
the standard statistical tests overstate the signifi-
cance of the apparent increase in the trend of pro-
ductivity because they disregard cyclical
influences. The final part describes the recent bias
of the conventional, fixed-weighted data and shows
that statistical analysis using the new chain-
weighted data sharply contradicts the steeper trend
view. Based on this analysis, the article concludes
that the productivity trend has not steepened in the
1990s.
ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE
STEEPER TREND VIEW 
The case for a steeper productivity trend is sup-
ported by both empirical evidence and theoretical
arguments. Empirically, standard statistical tests
suggest that productivity gains in the current expan-
sion have exceeded the typical cyclical improve-
ments in productivity. Theoretically, several factors
could have caused such a fundamental shift in long-
run productivity.
Andrew J. Filardo is an economist at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City. Paul Cooper, a research associate at
the bank, helped prepare the article.Statistical evidence of a steeper 
productivity trend
Recent data suggest that productivity may be
following a new, steeper trend. Nonfarm business
productivity has grown at an annual rate of just
under 2 percent in the 1990s, up from the roughly 1
percent rate in the previous two decades. This
growth is notable because in this expansion, which
began in the first quarter of 1991, productivity
growth has expanded more rapidly relative to out-
put growth than in other postwar expansions.
1
Formal statistical analysis supports the view that
productivity has begun to follow a new, steeper
trend. Chart 1 shows conventionally measured non-
farm business productivity and the estimated linear
trends it has followed since 1960. The trends ignore
cyclical influences and grow at different rates start-
ing in 1972:Q4, 1982:Q1, and 1990:Q4, dates
which standard statistical tests identify as statisti-
cally significant breakpoints. These breakpoints re-
veal four subperiods of trend productivity (see
appendix for description of statistical methodology
to identify breakpoints). Long-run productivity
grew most rapidly before 1973, slowed dramati-
cally in the 1970s, edged up in the 1980s, and now
in the 1990s appears to be climbing moderately.
2 To
highlight the steeper current trend, the dashed line
in the chart extends the linear trend established in
the first quarter of 1982. The divergence of the solid
and dashed lines in the 1990s illustrates the apparent
steeper trend of 1.7 percent currently being followed,
up from a rate of 1.0 percent earlier.
3
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42 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYFactors causing the steeper 
productivity trend
Economists who support the steeper trend view
routinely cite three factors underlying the sharp
productivity rise in the 1990s. These factors are
increased use of computers and computer-related
equipment, stronger plant and equipment invest-
ment, and widespread corporate downsizing. Theo-
retically, each factor can cause productivity to
increase more rapidly. Empirically, each factor has
coincided with the faster pace of conventionally
measured productivity.
Increased use of computers. The increased use of
computers can steepen the productivity trend by
improving the tools and technology that workers
use in their jobs. With greater computing power,
today’s workers can produce more goods of higher
quality than their counterparts could produce just a
decade ago. Computers have given firms versatility
to respond quickly to changing business conditions,
thereby making them more efficient. New comput-
ers and peripherals with their improved software
have enabled employees to assimilate more infor-
mation in less time.
4
Empirically, the growth in the use of computers
and peripheral equipment has accelerated in the
1990s. From services to manufacturing, computers
have become ubiquitous. Real investment of com-
puters and peripherals has skyrocketed from an
annual growth rate of 20 percent prior to 1991 to a
rate of 32 percent rate since then. This growth has
coincided with a consistent decline in computer
prices of about 14 percent annually (Chart 2).
Increased use of computers, especially faster and
more sophisticated computers, has also raised pros-
pects that technological progress will proceed at a
faster pace than in the recent past. These tools will
also help increase and spread existing knowledge,
thereby increasing the rate at which new ideas and
better computers arise. The empirical record sup-
ports this view. Greater computer investment has
been correlated with an increase in technological
progress, especially in manufacturing industries.
5
Expenditures on information-processing and re-
lated equipment, which includes new computers
and peripherals, have grown substantially for the
last 25 years with a significant pickup in the late
1970s and 1980s. Over this period, technological
progress, measured by multifactor productivity, has
also picked up by 0.5 percentage point for nonfarm
business and 2.3 percentage points for manufactur-
ing (Bureau of Labor Statistics and Lysko).
6
Stronger plant and equipment investment. Ana-
lysts also point to stronger plant and equipment
investment as a more general factor that could have
boosted productivity growth in the 1990s. Plant and
equipment investment can increase productivity
growth in two ways. First, plant and equipment
investment adds to the existing capital stock. With
a larger stock of capital, workers can increase their
output per hour of effort. For example, a construction
worker with a bigger dump truck can haul more dirt
in a day than a worker with a smaller truck. Second,
plant and equipment investment may increase the
rate of technological progress.
7 Some economists
argue that innovations in plant and equipment facili-
tate the use of existing technology and may quicken
the arrival of new ideas and future technology.
The growth of gross plant and equipment invest-
ment surged in the 1990s (Chart 3). From 1960 to
1990, plant and equipment investment rose at a 3.9
percent rate but since then has more than doubled
to 10.1 percent. Such a surge may help to account
for the faster pace of productivity in the 1990s.
Widespread corporate downsizing. During the
1990s, corporate downsizing became an important
tool to cut costs and trim excesses. A recent Ameri-
can Management Association (AMA) study noted
that at least 72 percent of firms in their survey had
downsized from 1989 to mid-1995.
8 Chart 4 illus-
trates an important development in corporate
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1995 43downsizing. Corporations have traditionally scaled
back employment primarily during cyclical down-
turns. In the current business cycle, however, firms
have been more willing to prune the workforce well
after the cyclical trough, which occurred in 1991.
In fact, 1994 was one of the top years for announced
layoffs due to downsizing in the current cycle, and
over half of the firms cited reasons other than
cyclical downturns for the layoffs.
9
Downsizing offers the promise of higher worker
productivity. If done correctly, firms are able to cut
their less productive workers and uncompetitive
product lines and retain their more productive
workers and profitable products. By trimming the
excesses, firms can become leaner and more prof-
itable. In fact, half of the firms that downsized from
1989 to 1994 have reaped higher profits. In the
process, output per worker might be expected to
rise. Thus, widespread downsizing could lead to
increased aggregate productivity.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST A STEEPER
TREND VIEW 
Further investigation reveals several arguments
against the steeper trend view of productivity. This
section first questions the importance of the link
between faster productivity growth and computers,
plant and equipment investment, and corporate
downsizing. Next, the section challenges the accuracy
of the standard statistical tests in detecting break-
points in the trends because cyclical influences are




* Relative price of computers is the computer price index divided by the CPI-U.  Index (1982:Q1 = 100).
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and author’s calculation.
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1995 45the evidence for a break in the conventionally mea-
sured productivity trend. The section then examines
the impact of bias in conventional, fixed-weighted
productivity data on tests to identify the trend
breaks. Chain-weighted productivity data, which
correct for the known bias in the fixed-weighted
data, not only paint a different picture of the pro-
ductivity trends over the last 25 years, but also
provide scant statistical evidence of a steeper pro-
ductivity trend in the 1990s.
Role of causal factors exaggerated
Increased computer use, stronger plant and equip-
ment investment, and widespread corporate down-
sizing, as indicated earlier, might have contributed
to faster productivity growth in the 1990s. The
theoretical links are plausible, and the correlation
with faster productivity growth in the 1990s is
striking. Yet, the empirical link between each factor
and faster productivity growth is not strong.
Computer and peripheral equipment investment.
Despite exceptional growth in their use, computers
and peripherals equipment cannot account for a
shift in productivity growth. To assess the quantita-
tive importance of computers’ contribution to pro-
ductivity growth, a growth accounting method can
be used. This method breaks down productivity
growth into two sources: growth in factors of pro-
duction—such as labor and capital—and techno-
logical progress. Because increased investment in
computers and peripheral equipment adds to the
economy’s capital stock, such investment has surely
contributed to productivity growth. The quantita-
tive significance of its contribution, however, depends
on the relative size of computers and peripheral
equipment as a component of the capital stock.
Even though the investment share of computers
nearly doubled from 1991 to the first half of 1995,
the share of computer and peripheral equipment
investment in the capital stock of the economy was
too small to significantly increase productivity.
10 In
fact, computers accounted for only about 2 percent
of the capital stock (Oliner and Sichel). To put this
into perspective, even if all firms had increased their
purchases of computers from 20 percent to 32 per-
cent per year (with no depreciation in the existing
stock of computers), the extra contribution to pro-
ductivity would have been just 0.002 percent.
11
Taking depreciation into account, the net contribu-
tion of information-processing investments would
have been even smaller.
Plant and equipment investment. Despite its rapid
growth since 1991, plant and equipment invest-
ment, excluding information-processing equip-
ment, appears to be showing strong cyclical
behavior with no apparent shift in trend. A good
portion of the growth of plant and equipment invest-
ment has been due to the growth of computer and
peripheral equipment investment. Excluding these
computer-related investments, the 1990-91 reces-
sion witnessed a sharp contraction in plant and
equipment investment. Since 1991, the growth has
surged to 9.6 percent. Chart 5 illustrates that plant
and equipment investment, excluding information-
processing equipment, has not exceeded its histori-
cal upward trend. Thus, it is doubtful that this factor
has spurred productivity. Moreover, several studies
have found that equipment investment, including
information-processing equipment, has not apprecia-
bly influenced the rate of technological progress.
12
Corporate downsizing. Even though downsizing
holds the promise of increased productivity, recent
survey data indicate that most downsized compa-
nies in the 1990s have  not increased productivity
despite increasing profits. The recent AMA survey
cited earlier showed that firms downsizing between
the second quarter of 1989 and 1995 have failed to
witness widespread productivity gains. In fact,
roughly two-thirds of the surveyed firms that down-
sized reported unchanged or lower productivity
levels. The AMA survey links this poor productivity
performance to morale problems and reorganiza-
tional snags following downsizing.
13
46 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYA recent plant-level manufacturing study largely
corroborates the conclusions of the AMA study.
Baily, Bartelman, and Haltiwanger examined the
consequences of downsizing at manufacturing
plants in the late 1980s. They found little systematic
evidence of a link between downsizing and produc-
tivity gains at manufacturing plants. Productivity
gains were found both in plants that increased and
plants that decreased their work force. In addition,
many downsized plants actually suffered a decline
in productivity.
These two studies contradict the conventional
wisdom that downsizing leads to higher productiv-
ity. Cutting the work force can have negative con-
sequences on productivity even though the
short-run effect on profits may be positive. While it
is possible that future downsizing efforts may im-
prove productivity growth as a result of lessons
learned in the 1990s, the waves of downsizing to
date cannot have caused aggregate productivity to
increase substantially.
Statistical evidence against a steeper trend
In addition to these challenges to the theoretical
arguments, further investigation of the statistical
evidence raises doubts about the validity of a new,
steeper trend of productivity in the 1990s. The
standard statistical analysis discussed earlier lends
support to the steeper trend view. The analysis,
however, may have provided faulty inferences. To
provide more reliable inferences about trend
breaks, this section corrects the bias in the standard
’64 ’68 ’72 ’76 ’84 1960
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1995 47statistical tests for cyclical influences. This section
also discusses implications of the well-known bias
in the conventional, fixed-weighted data and reexam-
ines the steeper trend view using the more accu-
rately measured chain-weighted productivity data.
The cycle-adjusted statistical test. The standard
statistical test for a trend break in the 1990s may
have been affected by the business cycle recession
of 1990-91. During recessions productivity typi-
cally falls below its trend. As the economy recovers,
productivity typically moves back toward the trend
and eventually overshoots it. This faster-than-trend
productivity pace after a business cycle trough may
cause the standard statistical test to falsely identify
a new, steeper trend.
To address this concern, a cycle-adjusted test
based on the bootstrap procedure is used (appen-
dix). While the cycle-adjusted test—using conven-
tional, fixed-weighted productivity data through
1995:Q2—still finds evidence of a break at the 5
percent confidence level, it does not find evidence
at the 1 percent confidence level. Thus, taking cy-
clical behavior into account, the apparent steeper
trend is not as strongly supported as indicated by
the standard statistical test.
Further application of the cycle-adjusted statis-
tical test raises additional doubts about the strength
of the steeper trend view. Instead of using data
through 1995:Q2, the modified test uses several
data subsamples. Initially, the test uses data
through the most recent business cycle trough
(1991:Q1) and finds no statistically evidence of a
trend break at the 5 percent confidence level.
Quarter by quarter, the end of the subsample is
sequentially extended and the cycle-adjusted test
performed. The test finally finds sufficient evi-
dence of a trend break by 1994:Q4—just three
quarters ago. Thus, productivity data released
since the end of 1994 are critical observations sup-
porting the steeper trend view.
14 
The three critical observations from 1994:Q4 to
1995:Q2 suggest empirical support for the steeper
trend view may be weak. If recent data have been
the result of special factors or turn out to be revised
downward, then the tentative conclusion of a break
in the 1990s may be overturned. Moreover, these
three critical observations point out the possibility
of a much more fundamental problem with the
steeper trend view. The statistical upward bias that
has been associated with the fixed-weighted data
has been particularly severe over the last three
quarters. Such a bias could have affected inferences
of a trend shift. To assess the impact of the bias, the
statistical tests of this section can be rerun using the
chain-weighted productivity data, which are not
subject to the bias.
Statistical tests using the chain-weighted data.
Traditionally, the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) has reported on economic activity using the
conventional fixed-weighted measure of real output.
This fall, however, the BEA will begin featuring a
chain-weighted index. The chain-weighted mea-
sure avoids the “substitution bias” associated with
the fixed-weighted measure (box). Consequently,
most analysts consider the chain-weighted measure
a more accurate indicator of economic activity. The
differences that arise from using the chain-weighted
data provide further arguments against the steeper
trend view.
Chain-weighted productivity data paint a picture
of productivity’s historical record that differs in
three ways from one using the conventional, fixed-
weighted data. First, the fixed-weighted productiv-
ity bias, as measured by the gap between the
chain-weighted and fixed-weighted measures, has
varied systematically across time. Chain-weighted
productivity grew more quickly on average than
fixed-weighted productivity before 1987. For years
near 1987, the two measures are virtually identical.
Since then, the chain-weighted data have grown
more slowly.
15
48 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYFIXED-WEIGHTED AND CHAIN-WEIGHTED OUTPUT 
AND PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES
In theory, labor productivity is measured as a
ratio of output per unit of labor input. In practice,
to measure productivity economists have tradi-
tionally relied on fixed-weighted, nonfarm
business productivity, which is the ratio of real,
fixed-weighted nonfarm business output to
nonfarm employee hours. This practice will
change in the fall of 1995 as the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) switches from featur-
ing the fixed-weighted measure of real output
to a chain-weighted measure. This box high-
lights some theoretical and empirical differences
between the two output measures and discusses
the implications for productivity measures.
16
Theoretically, the key difference between the
fixed-weighted and chain-weighted measures
is reflected in their names. With the fixed-
weighted method, price weights from a fixed
benchmark year are used to measure real out-
put. Currently, the conventional benchmark
year is 1987. With the chain-weighted measure,
price weights are chain-linked, which allows
the weights to change annually.
17
When the fixed-price weights differ signifi-
cantly from the chain-price weights, the fixed-
weighted output measure tends to mismeasure
real output. This difference naturally occurs as
one moves farther away from the fixed bench-
mark year because relative price changes tend
to lead to changes in purchasing habits. Gener-
ally, when the prices of goods and services fall,
consumers and businesses tend to substitute
away from the relatively high-priced goods,
thus causing the relatively low-priced goods
and services to experience faster growth. Con-
sequently, the fixed-weighted measure of real
output tends to overstate the growth rate of real
output because the faster growing sectors are
weighted with the relatively high 1987 prices.
The extent of the overstatement is called the
“substitution bias.”
18
The chain-weighted measure can remedy the
substitution bias by annually updating the price
weights. For example, one primary factor for
the substitution bias in the 1990s has been the
large, persistent declines in computer prices.
Each year computer and peripheral equipment
prices have fallen about 14 percent. From 1987
to 1991, the declines were associated with very
little bias. But, by 1995:Q2, the cumulative
price declines helped to contribute 0.7 percentage
point to the bias in the fixed-weighted measure.
The chain-weighted measure avoids this bias
by annually adjusting price weights because
year-to-year relative price changes are modest
when compared with cumulative multiyear
changes that affect the fixed-weighted measure.
Empirically, the fixed-weighted and chain-
weighted output measures paint slightly different
pictures of economic growth in the three sub-
periods: pre-1980s, the 1980s and early 1990s,
and post-1991. In the 1980s and early 1990s,
the fixed-weighted and chain-weighted mea-
sures of real output historically were similar. In
fact, from 1984 to 1991 the two measures were
virtually identical.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1995 49Second, the bias also has varied over business
cycle swings. The chain-weighted productivity
swings were more exaggerated before 1987, but
more muted after 1987, than the fixed-weighted
productivity swings. In the 1990s, for example, the
conventional fixed-weighted productivity measure
has overstated annual productivity growth by a
quarter percentage point on average in the 1990-91
recession and by nearly one percentage point in the
current expansion. From 1960 until the mid-1980s,
in contrast, fixed-weighted productivity under-
stated productivity growth in both expansions and
recessions.
20 
Third, and most important, the bias alters the
relative growth rates of the four subperiods of pro-
ductivity growth. Recall that in the rapid postwar
growth period prior to 1973:Q1, productivity
growth was 2.2 percent using the fixed-weighted
measures. Since then, fixed-weighted productivity
slowed markedly to 0.6 percent from 1973:Q1 to
1982:Q1, edged up to 1.0 percent from 1982:Q2 to
1990:Q4, and since 1990:Q4 appears to have re-
vived to 1.7 percent. 
Using the chain-weighted measure, history looks
different. Clearly, pre-1973 was a period of rapid
productivity growth according to both measures.
Chain-weighted productivity grew at 2.8 percent
annually. After that period, chain-weighted produc-
tivity appears to have grown more quickly before
1987 and more slowly after 1987. Together, the
upward revision in the 1970s and the downward
revision in the 1990s have straightened the trends
in the three subsequent subperiods; growth since
1972:Q4 has averaged about 1 percent annually in
each of the subperiods. Consequently, the chain-
weighted data raise the possibility there were no
breaks in trend productivity in either 1982 or the
1990s.
FIXED-WEIGHTED AND CHAIN-WEIGHTED OUTPUT AND PRODUCTIVITY
MEASURES (continued)
Before 1980, however, the fixed-weighted
output tended to grow more slowly than the
chain-weighted output. From 1960 to 1980,
fixed-weighted output grew 3.4 percent annually
while chain-weighted output grew 3.7 percent
annually. Business cycles were also more muted
under the fixed-weighted measure in this period.
19
Since 1991, chain-weighted output has grown
2.8 percent annually, while fixed-weighted out-
put has grown at a much faster 3.3 percent rate.
This 0.5 percentage point difference suggests
that the current expansion has been less robust
than previously thought. 
The chain-weighted output picture implies a
different productivity picture in the postwar
period. Chain-weighted productivity grew
more quickly than fixed-weighted productivity
when chain-weighted output grew more
quickly than the fixed-weighted output. Con-
versely, chain-weighted productivity grew
more slowly than fixed-weighted productivity
when chain-weighted output grew more slowly
than the fixed-weighted output. For example,
since 1991, chain-weighted output has grown
more slowly than conventional, fixed-weighted
output. As a result, recent productivity has been
overstated.
50 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYTests with the chain-weighted productivity data
confirm the absence of trend breaks during the
1980s and 1990s. In contrast to conventional, fixed-
weighted productivity data, chain-weighted pro-
ductivity data exhibit a steady, unchanged trend
since 1973. Chart 6 overlays the chain-weighted
productivity data and its estimated linear trend. In
the post-1972 period, long-run productivity began
rising at a 1.1 percent rate with no apparent evidence
of a break. Statistical tests confirm the visual
impression suggested in Chart 6. Standard and
cycle-adjusted statistical tests using the chain-
weighted data find no evidence of a break after
1972.
21 Productivity appears to follow the 1.1
percent trend line quite closely.
22 Thus, the sub-
stitution bias in the fixed-weighted data has
helped to bias standard and cycle-adjusted tests
toward identifying a productivity trend break in
the 1990s.
SUMMARY
This article finds no compelling evidence that
trend productivity has steepened in the 1990s.
Theoretical arguments supporting the steeper trend
view—the increased use of computers, stronger
plant and equipment investment, and widespread
corporate downsizing—are qualitatively plausible,
but quantitatively impotent. In addition, standard
statistical tests strongly supporting the steeper
trend view are misleading. The cycle-adjusted
test using the fixed-weighted data provides only
weak support for the steeper trend view. This test
also shows that recent productivity gains have
90
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1995 51prejudiced inferences toward finding a trend
break. Inferences made from the recent, conven-
tionally measured data may be misleading because
the recent strong growth in productivity has coin-
cided with a well-documented, upward bias in these
fixed-weighted data. This article evaluates the
impact of the bias by considering chain-weighted
productivity data that are immune to the bias and
are considered more accurately measured. Using
chain-weighted data, the long-run trend of produc-
tivity has remained unchanged, growing 1.1 percent
annually since the early 1970s. In sum, this article
concludes that the productivity trend has not steep-
ened in the 1990s.
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This appendix describes the statistical analy-
sis used in the article to test for a shift in the
trend of labor productivity. A statistical linear
trend model is estimated, and two testing meth-
ods are used to identify trend breaks. The first
is standard statistical test and the second is a
business-cycle-adjusted test, which addresses
some known weaknesses in the standard test.
The appendix will highlight the statistical sig-
nificance of the article’s results (Table A1).
Statistical model
The trend model of productivity uses a single-
equation regression method. The dependent
variable is the logarithm of nonfarm business
labor productivity denoted by yt. The explana-
tory variables include a constant, a piecewise
linear time trend, Ti , and an error term, et.
yt = constant + å
i=1
n
  ai Ti + et .
The least square coefficients ai are estimators
of the slope of the productivity trend in each of
the n subperiods. Each coefficient can be inter-
preted as average growth rate of productivity
between the breakpoint dates.
23
Standard statistical tests
This article uses a standard statistical test to
detect shifts in the productivity trend. Techni-
cally, this test is similar to a Chow breakpoint
test. Instead of choosing a candidate breakpoint
to test, this method searches over all dates for
possible breaks in the slope of the productivity
trend. The statistical significance of a trend
break is tested using critical values from an
F-distribution;  if the estimated model gener-
ates an F-statistic greater than the critical value,
then the test indicates a statistically significant
trend break.
Several tests were run to test for a break
before the 1990s. Sequentially, the method
searched over all possible breakpoints. When
one was found by maximizing the F-statistic
prior to the 1990s, the breakpoint was noted and
the procedure was repeated. Using fixed-
weighted nonfarm productivity, this method
found trend breaks at 1972:Q4 and 1982:Q1.
The trend growth rate was 2.2 percent before
1972:Q4 and 0.6 percent from 1972:Q4 to
1982:Q1.
Given these breaks, two sets of tests were run
to examine a break in the 1990s. First, using
data through 1995:Q2, the sequential break-
point tests were run and yielded a statistically
significant breakpoint in 1990:Q4. The growth
rate from 1982:Q1 to 1990:Q4 was 1.0 percent
and the trend growth rate afterward was 1.7
percent. Second, research earlier in the decade
failed to find a trend break in the productivity
series and thus suggested that the faster pace of
productivity growth simply reflected cyclical
fluctuations. To reassess this earlier research,
the data series was truncated at 1991:Q1. The
breakpoint test was run and verified the finding
that no statistically significant evidence indicates
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1995 53a trend break using data up to 1992:Q4. In fact,
using the 5 percent confidence levels, the F-
distribution critical value was not breached un-
til 1994:Q1. At the 1 percent confidence level,
the critical value was not breached until
1994:Q4.
Business-cycle-adjusted statistical tests
The standard statistical testing methodology
suffers from a well-known problem which can
be addressed with the test outlined in this sec-
tion. The sequential procedure in the previous
section generates F-statistics that produce in-
consistent inferences when compared with the
standard F-distribution. In general, the critical
values from the F-distribution are too low and
consequently may cause faulty inferences about
a trend break. One way to avoid these problems
is to generate corrected critical values.
To obtain corrected critical values, this article
modifies the standard methods in three ways.
First, instead of using theoretical critical values,
empirical critical values are computed using
simulation techniques. The statistical model is
simulated 25,000 times under the assumption
that there was no break in the 1990s. For each
simulation, an F-statistic is computed. Then, an
empirical F-distribution is tabulated for the 1
percent and 5 percent critical values. Second,
each simulation is run using a set of estimated
shocks, instead of using shocks from a normal
distribution. The set of shocks are the estimated
error series, et. This procedure, technically re-
ferred to as a bootstrap simulation, is preferred
because macroeconomic series such as produc-
tivity are at odds with the assumption of nor-
mally distributed random numbers. Third, the
simulation method in this article corrects the





    break  test  at  1990:Q4    




1991:Q1-1995:Q2 1.7 .18 .002 .012
Chain-Weighted Productivity
1959:Q3-1972:Q4 2.9 .04
1973:Q1-1995:Q2 1.0 .06 .984 .787
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1 From the trough in 1991:Q1 to 1995:Q2, real GDP has
grown 2.9 percent annually, while nonfarm business
productivity has grown at a respectable 2.2 percent rate. In
comparison with postwar expansions, this productivity
increase is even more impressive because output growth in
the 1990s was sluggish (Kahn). Comparing the current
expansion to those that started in 1961, 1975, and 1982, real
GDP for the first 17 quarters rose 4.5 percent annually, while
productivity logged only a 2.1 percent increase. 
It should also be noted that the small difference between
the productivity growth rates is misleading. Special factors in
the earlier expansions tend to overstate productivity growth.
In particular, the decade of the 1960s was clearly a faster
growth period, and the 1970s and 1980s recessions were
deeper than in the 1990s.
2 The trend growth rate of productivity declined from 2.4
percent annually to a 0.6 percent rate in the early 1970s. Since
then the trend steepened from 1.0 percent between 1982:Q1
and 1990:Q4 to 1.7 percent after 1990:Q4.
Using data through 1995:Q2, the statistical model finds
sufficient statistical evidence to support the steepened trend
influences. In particular, the method adjusts for
the 1990-91 recession. In recessions, productivity
tends to fall rapidly and then during expansions
tends to recover robustly. Such a pattern over a
short time period could cause standard methods
to identify a new trend when, in fact, the fluc-
tuations simply reflect cyclical behavior.
Using the cycle-corrected critical values, the
fixed-weighted productivity shows a break in
1972:Q4 and 1982:Q1 as before. There also
appears to be some evidence of a break in the
1990s. The trend break in 1990:Q4, however,
garners less statistical support. The break can-
not be rejected with a p-value of 1.2 percent
(whereas the break cannot be rejected using the
standard statistical tests with p-value of 0.2
percent).
Further investigation using the cycle-adjusted
tests shows that the p-value falls below the 5
percent level in 1994:Q4. This cycle-adjusted test
result together with the associated standard sta-
tistical test results raises questions about
whether evidence of the break may be partly
due to the mismeasurement of the conventional,
fixed-weighted data, since the fixed-weighted
data have begun to show a substantial upward
substitution bias over the last few years.
To examine this possibility, this article esti-
mates the statistical model with the chain-
weighted data and performs the standard and
cycle-adjusted tests, instead of trying to adjust
the critical values for substitution bias in the
fixed-weighted productivity data. Both the
standard and cycle-adjusted tests yield similar
inferences. The tests find no trend break in the
1990s with p-values better than 75 percent.
Testing for breaks before 1990 (not reported),
this article identifies only one statistically sig-
nificant break in 1972:Q4; the 1982:Q1 and
1990:Q4 breaks do not appear to be statistically
significant.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1995 55productivity view. The standard statistical tests identify a
break in trend at 1990:Q4 with significance at better than
two-tenths of 1 percent (test statistic of 10.3).
Note also that if the pre-1973 trend line were extended to
the present, productivity would be 35.5 percent higher, which
would support a much higher standard of living.
3 By 1995:Q2, productivity was 10 percent above the trend
set in the 1980s, which is denoted by the dotted line in Chart
1. In contrast, productivity has typically overshot its trend by
3 percent 17 quarters into an expansion.
4 In contrast to neoclassical growth models, Romer (1990,
1994) argues that new technology becomes available
endogenously. As firms invest a greater amount into research
and development—like increased use of computers—the
pace of technological progress is expected to quicken. In a
different context, Boskin and Lau discuss the empirical
complementarity between technological progress and capital
investment.
5 Siegel and Griliches find a “positive correlation between
productivity growth (but not acceleration of productivity) and
investment in computers.”  Dedrick and Kraemer investigate
the contribution of information technology on productivity
growth in Asian countries from 1984 to 1990, and discover
that stronger information technology investment leads to
faster productivity growth. Using recent firm-level data,
Brynjolfsson and Hitt, and Lichtenberg both find that
computer equipment has had a significant impact on firm
output. 
6 Some economists believe that computers may have
contributed more to productivity growth than has been
officially reported. The unreported contribution arises
because output growth—and hence productivity growth—is
difficult to measure in certain sectors of the economy.
Productivity in the service sector is generally thought to be
understated because quality changes in output are difficult to
measure. For example, grocery stores may report little
productivity growth based on traditional measures. However,
the increased use of computers has allowed stores to more
accurately track inventories, which results in increased
variety at lower prices. In addition, computers and scanners
enable clerks to check out patrons more quickly than in the
past. Such productivity gains go unreported by data
collectors. More generally, quality changes in many sectors
of the economy, especially in industries with hard-to-measure
output, may go unmeasured resulting in an understatement of
“true” productivity growth. Consequently, quality
improvements from computers may have increased trend
productivity but these improvements will not show up in the
measured productivity data used in this article.
7 De Long and Summers (1992a, 1992b) argue that plant and
equipment investment not only has a direct impact on
productivity growth by increasing the capital stock but also
has an indirect impact by increasing the rate of technological
progress. In an international comparison, they show that
countries that invest more in plant and equipment also
experience faster productivity growth.
8 The AMA surveyed human resource managers in
AMA-member companies. They sampled roughly 10 percent
of 8,000 firms, which represents one-fourth of the work force.
The survey has been conducted annually since 1987. For
more details, see 1995 AMA Survey on Downsizing and
Assistance to Displaced Workers.
An earlier survey by the Conference Board corroborates the
extent of downsizing in the economy. In the Conference
Board survey, 85 percent of the 406 large firms surveyed had
instituted some sort of downsizing in the previous five years.
9 According to the 1995 AMA survey, the rationale for
downsizing was the following: 43.7 percent, actual or
anticipated downturn; 34.5 percent, improved staff
utilization;  19.1 percent, transfer of production or work; 19.7
percent, automation or other new technology; 10.4 percent,
merger or acquisition; 5.0 percent, plant or office
obsolescence.
10 Baily and Gordon, and Roach discuss the “productivity
paradox.”  They find that the aggregate impact of computers
and peripheral equipment in the 1970s and 1980s has been
small, at best. Despite the rapid growth of computer
investment and declining prices, aggregate productivity did
not grow considerably faster. 
Since their research was published, the growth in
computers and peripheral equipment has continued to rise
significantly in recent years, but the size of the sector may
still be too small to appreciably affect the aggregate. For
example, since 1991, computer investment’s share nearly
doubled, but as of the first half of 1995, computers still only
accounted for 3.1 percent of aggregate output.
11 If the increase at 32 percent were sustained into the
indefinite future, the contribution would be approximately
0.002 = (0.32 percent - 0.20 percent)*0.02. This is probably
an upper bound since most of the increased gross investment
is just offsetting depreciation of the existing capital stock. 
12 Auerbach, Hassett, and Oliner dispute the earlier findings
of De Long and Summers (1992a). Auerbach and others find
that plant and equipment investment has led to a small
increase in technological progress. Brendt and Morrison also
provide a similar conclusion.
56 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY13 Domestic and foreign outsourcing has increased as firms
have downsized. Outsourcing raises the possibility that
productivity growth may be overstated. Siegel and Griliches
show that outsourcing appears to have little effect on
aggregate productivity. Fixler and Siegel find some impact
of outsourcing but argue the impact will likely be short-lived.
14 Earlier studies found some evidence that productivity
growth during the first couple years of the expansion was
consistent with typical cyclical gains (Gordon);  since then,
however, productivity has continued to rise at a relatively fast
pace. The Economic Report of the President (1995) argued
that the trend may have steepened. Conventionally
measured data have continued to grow over 3 percent in
the last year.
15 Recent evidence from the chain-weighted productivity
data may affect the economic outlook of economists and
policymakers, especially those who based their outlook on
the conventional, fixed-weighted productivity data and the
standard statistical test. One change in their outlook is that
trend productivity has grown more slowly under the
chain-weighted data than previously reported with
fixed-weighted data. As a consequence, potential output as
measured by the chain-weighted data also has grown more
slowly than previously thought using the conventional data
(Kahn). It should be noted, however, that slower potential
output growth need not suggest that the economy has been
experiencing greater resource pressures than previously
thought using the conventionally measured data, because
output growth under the chain-weighted measure has also
been slower. Another change in their outlook is that the slower
chain-weighted productivity growth translates into faster
chain-weighted unit labor costs. Conventionally reported unit
labor costs have been rising at a 1.5 percent annual rate, while
chain-weighted measures have been rising at a 2.4 percent
rate. Thus, incipient wage pressures may have been greater
than previously thought, despite slower chain-weighted
output growth during the current expansion. These tentative
conclusions may fundamentally change views about the
economy by many who have not focused on the more
accurately measured chain-weighted output data.
16 The BEA has published a series of articles that provide
details of the fixed-weighted and chain-weighted output
measures. These articles also provide details on the
advantages and disadvantages, on how to calculate growth
rates, and on scheduled revisions for price weights. See Triplett,
Young (1992, 1993), and Landefeld, Parker, and Triplett.
17 For example, the formula used to calculate the 1995 annual
gross growth rate of fixed-weighted GDP (Laspeyres quantity
measure) is
FW Growth Rate = FW94,95 = å Pi,1987 Qi,1995
å Pi,1987 Qi,1994
 ,
where Qi, t is the quantity of good i in year t and Pi, t is the
price of good i in year t. The gross growth rate for nonadjacent
years is, for example, FW92,95.
The chain-weighted or Fisher Ideal Method (base years
change annually) for the 1995 annual gross growth rate is 
CW Growth Rate = CW 94,95 = 
å Pi,1994 Qi,1995
å Pi,1994 Qi,1994
  ´  å Pi,1995 Qi,1995
å Pi,1995 Qi,1994
The chain-weighted measure is the geometric mean of a
Paasche and Laspeyres quantity index. In contrast to the
fixed-weighted measure, the gross growth rate for
nonadjacent years cannot be calculated directly. Instead, the
annual growth rates are chain-linked. For example, the
growth rate from 1992 to 1995 is CW92,93*CW93,94
*CW94,95.
18 The table below illustrates how different base year prices
can cause the fixed-weighted and chain-weighted measures
of real output to diverge. A fictitious economy is constructed
that has witnessed considerable change. From 1987 to 1994
the economy has increased its share of computers as the
relative price of computers has fallen sharply.
Ö ``````` `               
A FICTITIOUS ECONOMY
Economic data
1987 1992 1993 1994
Pcomputer 100 45 35 30
Pother 100 100 100 100
Qcomputer 1 1.7 2.8 3.8




Fixed-weighted 1987 base 3.1 4.1
Chain-weighted base 2.5 3.6
Fixed-weighted 1992 base 2.5 3.6
Substitution bias .6 .5
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fixed-weighted and chain-weighted methods demonstrates
that as the composition of the economy changes, the 1987
fixed-weighted measure of real output overstates the growth
rate. For example, in 1994 the 1987 fixed-weighted growth
rate is 4.1 percent, considerably higher than the 3.6 percent
rate measured by the chain-weighted and 1992 fixed-
weighted measures. The overstatement is called the
“substitution bias.”
Intuitively, the 1987 fixed-weighted growth rate is biased
upward because the growth in the computer industry is
weighted too heavily in the calculation. Instead of a price
weight close to 30 to 35, the 1987 price weight for computers
is 100. In contrast, if more representative price weights were
used that better reflect the 1993-94 economy, the bias is
eliminated.
19 From 1960 to 1990, the fixed-weighted measure
understated growth by 0.5 percentage point in expansions and
by 0.3 percentage point in recessions.
20 From 1960 to 1982, the fixed-weighted measure
understated productivity growth by 0.6 percentage point in
expansions and by 0.2 percentage point in recessions.
21 With the chain-weighted productivity data, the p-values
for the tests of a trend break in the 1990s are 0.984 for
standard statistical tests and 0.787 for the cycle-adjusted tests.
P-values less than 0.05 provide evidence of a break at the 5
percent confidence level. These tests are more fully described
in the appendix.
22 The unchanged trend result found with the nonfarm
productivity data is also corroborated using the
manufacturing data. Since measures of nonmanufacturing
industries are thought to underestimate productivity growth,
both fixed-weighted and chain-weighted nonfarm business
productivity could be downwardly biased. If so, the evidence
of an unchanged trend of measured productivity does not rule
out the possibility that productivity has actually started rising
faster in the 1990s.
To investigate this possibility, an annual chain-weighted
manufacturing series was constructed by the author using
fixed-weighted and chain-weighted manufacturing gross
product originating (GPO) and dividing by hours data.
Manufacturing productivity, which accounts for roughly 20
percent of output, is thought to be a more reliable measure of
productivity than aggregate output because manufacturing
output is easier to measure. For example, the output of a car
plant is much more tangible and easier to measure than the
output of medical services. Moreover, quality improvements
for cars can be measured relatively more accurately than
quality improvements in cancer treatment.
The constructed series suffers from two drawbacks that
obscure the information about trend breaks. First, the data are
available only at an annual frequency. Second, the data on
manufacturing GPO are available up to 1993. From 1980 to
1990, the chain-weighted manufacturing productivity grew
at an annual 3.2 percent rate, and the fixed-weighted measure
grew at an annual 2.9 percent rate. From 1991 to 1993, the
chain-weighted and fixed-weighted measures have grown at
roughly an annual 2.5 percent rate. Overall, chain-weighted
and fixed-weighted productivity measures show no apparent
shift in their trends in the 1990s—if any trend emerges, it is
more gradual.
23 Bai describes the econometric theory behind testing for
break tests for regression coefficients. Lumsdaine and Papell,
and Canjels and Watson consider the econometrics of linear
time trend estimation. The autocorrelated errors in the
estimated statistical trend model of this article led to
simulations using an AR1 model.
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